Memory of the Present: Empathy and Identity in Young Adult Fiction by Nikolajeva, Maria
NARRATIVE WORKS: ISSUES, INVESTIGATIONS, & INTERVENTIONS 4(2), 86-107 





SPECIAL ISSUE: NARRATIVE EMOTIONS AND THE 
SHAPING(S) OF IDENTITY 
 
Memory of the Present:  
Empathy and Identity in Young Adult Fiction 
 
Maria Nikolajeva  
Cambridge University 
 
Recent studies in cognitive literary criticism have provided scholars of 
literature with new, stimulating approaches to literary texts and neuroscientists 
with new insights about human emotions, empathy, and memory through 
evidence from fiction. What have so far been largely neglected are the 
implications of cognitive criticism for the study of literature targeting a young 
audience, whose theory of mind and empathic skills are not yet fully developed. 
A cognitive approach to children's and young adult literature has to meet 
several challenges less relevant in general fiction. Firstly, how is a young 
fictional character's consciousness represented by an author whose cognitive 
and affective skills are ostensibly superior? Secondly, how do texts instruct 
their young readers to employ theory of mind in order to assess both the young 
protagonist's emotions and their understanding of other characters' emotions 
(higher-order mind-reading)? Thirdly, how can fiction support young people's 
development of their theory of mind? The paper will discuss these issues with a 
particular focus on memory and identity, expressed textually through tense and 
narrative perspective. Drawing on work by Lisa Zunshine (2006) and Blackey 
Vermeule (2010), the predominantly theoretical argument will be illustrated by 
a contemporary young adult novel, Slated (2012), by Teri Terry.  
 
Self-knowledge and a sense of identity are central for our 
existence. Childhood and adolescence are periods of identity formation. 
Adolescence, especially, is a dynamic and turbulent phase of human life, 
and it is perhaps young adult fiction that has the strongest potential to 
offer readers somewhat accurate portrayals of selfhood. Scholars of 
young adult (YA) fiction have recently learned some important facts from 
neuroscience. Adolescence is a period of human life when the brain, still 
more intensively than before, learns to recognise and attribute mental 
states to ourselves as well as other people. Adolescents' deviant behaviour 
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is the consequence of the social brain's development. Strong emotions 
override adolescents' ability to take other people's perspectives. Actions 
such as planning, decision-making, and synthesis of information are still 
underdeveloped in the adolescent brain. All these processes take more 
effort in adolescence than in adulthood (see e.g., Adams & Berzonsky, 
2003; Blakemore & Frith, 2005; Goswami, 2007). YA fiction has been 
trying for ages to reflect this laborious development that brain research 
has only recently confirmed through experiments. 
 While the narrative features of YA fiction have been discussed 
extensively (e.g., Cadden, 2011; McCallum, 1999; Nikolajeva, 2010; 
Wall, 1991), there are so far few studies inspired by cognitive criticism, 
in particular the direction utilising empathy and theory of mind as 
analytical tools, such as Lisa Zunshine's Why We Read Fiction: Theory of 
Mind and the Novel (2006), Suzanne Keen's Empathy and the Novel 
(2007), and Blakey Vermeule's Why Do We Care about Literary 
Characters? (2010). In this article I will use the young adult novel Slated 
(2012), by the British author Teri Terry, to explore the potential of 
cognitive criticism for a new “way of thinking about literature” 
(Stockwell, 2002, p. 6) written and marketed for young audiences. My 
purpose is thus not to offer an interpretation of a specific literary text, but 
to illustrate the method.  
Slated has three features recognisable from the narrative 
conventions of this literary form: it is told in the first person, it is told in 
the present tense, and it uses italics to mark memory narrative. I will 
return to the italicised passages in the novel in due time, but will first 
discuss the use of tense and point of view. Temporality is decisive for our 
cognitive and emotional engagement with fiction (see West-Pavlov, 2013, 
pp. 87-92). We only exist in the present, while fiction allows us to 
oscillate between various temporal levels, to go back in narrative time, to 
re-live, re-play, and perhaps re-vision memories. The temporal variations 
contribute to heteroglossia, the hallmark of the modern and postmodern 
novel. Even if the story time is short, as in Ulysses (Joyce, 1922/1993) or 
Mrs Dalloway (Woolf, 1925/2008), the stretched discourse time includes 
layers upon layers of tensed time, in addition to multiple consciousnesses. 
The present-tense first-person perspective reduces the narrative 
multiplicity, one of the strongest incentives for the reader to engage with 
fiction. If we only hear one unambiguous voice in a strictly defined 
moment of time we lose the attraction of fiction: the possibility of 
penetrating other people's consciousness. 
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A consistent present-tense first-person narration is the closest 
approximation to an explicit “here and now” experience that does not 
allow reflection on the past nor anticipation of the future. In other words, 
it constructs the fictional self as static and stable. Cultural geographer 
Doreen Massey (2005) describes space as a bundle of trajectories: all 
living and inanimate objects come from somewhere and move further to 
somewhere else. A present-tense first-person narration loses the 
trajectory, focusing on one singular point of timespace. It loses the depth 
and dynamism essential for the formation of identity. It confines the 
reader's vicarious experience to a single consciousness in a temporal 
singularity. 
It is conceivable that contemporary YA authors employ present 
tense because of the assumptions that young people live here and now, 
and that their perception of time and space is underdeveloped, perhaps a 
residue from Piaget (1928, 1969; see also Bruner & Haste, 1987). 
However, the excessive use of present tense sets a limitation in the 
temporal possibilities offered by fiction. The words “here” and “now” are 
deictic shifters, and unless they are unequivocal, as they inevitably 
become in a present-tense narrative, they account for the complexity of 
narrative that demands reader's attention and imagination—that is, 
cognitive activity. From the cognitive point of view, it implies that 
present-tense narratives offer less resistance to readers. If we consider 
some of the great modernist novels narrated in the first person, such as 
Proust's Remembrance of Things Past (1913-1927/1983), the very 
premise of their narrative is the constant change of temporality, the subtle 
split of the experiencing and the narrating self which allows the 
exploration of identity formation.  
Suzanne Nalbantian (2003) and Anne Whitehead (2009) offer a 
comprehensive account of philosophical approaches to memory and a set 
of examples illustrating the use of memory in literature. Temporality of 
texts that allows narrators to return to events in their past is central in 
these discussions. Both works highlight instances of metafictional 
portrayal of memory, a deliberate depiction of the process of 
remembering (not unexpectedly, both refer to Proust as a persuasive 
illustration). Both emphasise memory as the fundamental aspect of 
identity. Both point out that memory is embodied in time and space, and 
that it is connected to sensory perception and emotions. Memory is 
doubtless the greatest narrative engine in fiction. Not only does it mould 
the fictional characters' identity, making it fluid and more resemblant of a 
real human being; it also evokes readers' memories and thus affects their 
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identities in interaction with fiction. Again, this is why we read fiction: it 
has the power to shape our identities. Until recently, we could not really 
explain how it is possible; today we know, thanks to neuroscience, that 
reading fiction definitely improves readers' theory of mind (Kidd & 
Castano, 2013).  
It all works neatly until we start looking at children's and young 
adult fiction. How can YA literature employ the richness of narrative 
possibilities afforded by fiction? Isn't this limitation exactly what 
adversaries of YA literature point out as its inevitable inferiority? If, as 
cognitive psychology points out, adults have a better understanding of 
their own (as well as other people's) thoughts and feelings, the adolescent 
perspective in fiction should logically impede the artistic project. If an 
adolescent mind cannot assess its own reactions, if it defies reason, if it is 
a pandemonium of random impressions, how then can a purportedly 
adolescent narrative voice convey an authentic, but at the same time 
comprehensible, portrayal of this chaotic consciousness? If lack of 
coherence is the very token of a young person's state of mind, how can its 
narrative be sufficiently coherent to be understood by an outsider, that is, 
the reader?  
And yet, YA fiction attempts to convey exactly an adolescent's 
inability to understand the world and other people; the confusion and 
anxiety of being young; the discomfort about the profound changes in 
mind and body. Fiction takes on the challenge of representing a 
physiological and psychological condition through the only means fiction 
has—words. Experimental psychology has its tools to study real 
adolescents' brains, with concrete and measurable results. Readers only 
have words to rely on, but language is inadequate to convey complex 
mental states. While language is ordered and structured, thoughts and 
feelings are vague and nebulous.  
Recent massive studies in cognitive criticism have provided 
scholars of literature with new stimulating approaches to literary texts and 
neuroscientists with new insights about human emotions, empathy, and 
memory through evidence from fiction (in addition to aforementioned 
works, see also Burke, 2011; Hogan 2011, 2012; László, 2008; Oatley, 
2011, 2012; Zunshine, 2012, to name a few). Even though some of these 
studies occasionally mention a children's book, what have so far been 
largely neglected are the implications of cognitive criticism for the study 
of fiction targeting young readers, who not only lack the real-life 
experience of a full range of emotions, but who also have not yet fully 
developed theory of mind. The few cognitive studies of YA literature 
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have been mainly inspired by schema theory that goes back to George 
Lakoff and Mark Johnson's groundbreaking work, Metaphors We Live By 
(1980) and that has been developed by other cognitive scholars (Gibbs, 
1994; Hogan, 2003b; Turner, 1996). Schema theory explains readers' 
engagement with fiction through recognition of schemas or 
acknowledgement of deviation from schemas, the latter demanding 
attention and memory that allow adjustment and restructuring (see Hogan, 
2003a, pp. 29-48; Stockwell, 2002, pp. 78-81). YA literature scholars 
have concentrated on scripts, schemas, prototypes, universals, metaphors 
and conceptual blending (Shonoda, 2012; Stephens, 2011). It is 
gratifying, since YA fiction is indeed abundant in recurrent patterns, 
including identity formation (see Trites, 2012, 2014). There are just a few 
publications that explore another direction of cognitive criticism, focused 
on theory of mind and empathy (Kümmerling-Meibauer, 2012; Silva, 
2013).  
Cognitive studies frequently base their inferences about cognitive 
and affective responses on cases involving people with various brain 
damage (e.g., Damasio, 2006). Young readers may not have mastered the 
ability to empathise yet, but they are in the process of developing this 
skill. Their involvement with young fictional characters, whose theory of 
mind is also in the making, is still more complicated than adult readers' 
engagement with adult fictional characters. This additional dimension of 
cognitive criticism is the focus of my current research (Nikolajeva, 2012a, 
2012b, 2012c, 2013, 2014), which has to meet several challenges less 
relevant in general fiction. Firstly, how is a young fictional character's 
mind represented by an author whose cognitive and affective skills are 
ostensibly superior, or at least more developed? Secondly, how do texts 
instruct their young readers to employ empathy and theory of mind in 
order to assess both the character's emotions and their understanding of 
other characters' emotions (higher-order mind-reading)? Thirdly, how can 
fiction affect young people's cognitive and emotional development? The 
last question is of an educational nature, and I am less intent upon it for 
the present purpose, but it cannot be totally ignored (see Kümmerling-
Meibauer & Meibauer, 2013; and Kümmerling-Meibauer, 2014, in this 
issue).  
Children's and YA literature is a unique literary mode since it is 
based on a power imbalance between the adult author and the young 
reader (see Nodelman, 2008; Nikolajeva, 2010). It has been repeatedly 
claimed that adult authors are unequivocally in a position to portray 
young characters' mental and emotional states because they have once 
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been children and therefore remember what it was like to be a child. 
Purportedly, this enables them to express artistically the experience of a 
child self. Cognitive criticism strongly interrogates this assumption. 
Recent memory studies have provided a significantly better understanding 
of how memory works (e.g., Baddeley, 1999; Schacter, 1997, 2001; 
Tulving & Craik, 1999; see Foster, 2009, for a short overview). To put it 
simply, long-term episodic memory that preserves our real-life experience 
is subjective, incoherent, fragmentary, disjunctive, random, and 
imprecise. What is stored and what is retrieved has little resemblance to 
what has actually happened, if it happened at all. The so-called childhood 
memories described by authors, whether idyllic or traumatic, are 
complete confabulations. They may remember—which is also 
contestable—superficial events, but not the exact mental states they 
experienced (cf. Hogan 2003a, pp. 159-162). Therefore, the notorious 
child perspective of children's literature is an illusion. These “memories” 
are just as much a construction as any other fiction, and they are most 
likely based on a nostalgic view of childhood, on “self-induced emotional 
states of longing for the past” (Nalbantian, 2003, p. 41).  
However, a children's or YA writer does have a wide range of 
narrative devices to maintain this illusion. One may assume that interior 
monologue would be adequate; it is indeed employed quite frequently in 
contemporary YA fiction—with or without italics—although hardly on 
the scope of Anna Karenina (Tolstoy, 1873-1877/2003) or Ulysses 
(Joyce, 1922/1993). However, to be plausible, an adolescent’s interior 
monologue must inevitably be adapted to his or her cognitive and 
linguistic level. A more successful strategy is blended narration, in which 
an internally focalised young character's consciousness is rendered 
through an outside (extradiegetic-heterodiegetic) narrative voice, 
ostensibly an adult voice that can translate an adolescent's thoughts and 
emotions into a language and with the level of self-reflection that a young 
person is not capable of. This device is, however, different from the ironic 
narrator of narratologists' favourite example, Henry James' What Maisie 
Knew (1897/1998), in which the text and the reader communicate over the 
character's head. Modernist fiction excels in exploiting a child perspective 
at the child's expense, as it also does with a mentally disturbed person, 
such as Benjy in William Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury 
(1929/1994) or Lennie in John Steinbeck's Of Mice and Men (1937/2006). 
The effect is defamiliarisation, which offers an expert reader challenge, 
resistance, and pleasure, while a novice reader may get disoriented. 
However, this is a business between the author and the reader, and literary 
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scholars have not worried about the “average readers’” undeveloped taste. 
YA authors ostensibly have responsibilities toward their audience. A text 
addressed to young readers should preferably be accessible to them and 
invite empathic identification; otherwise, the readers will be just as 
confused as Maisie. It is a matter of debate at what age children develop 
comprehension of irony (see Walsh, 2011; Winner, 1988). While some 
YA novels use ironic narration, it is generally believed to be less suitable 
for the young audience. Hence, blended narration, in which the (adult) 
narrator's discourse prompts the readers how to use theory of mind to 
assess focalised characters' consciousness. This narrative form, of course, 
presupposes a third-person perspective.  
If personal perspective is for some reason preferable, retrospective 
self-narration is widely employed by YA literature from Treasure Island 
(Stevenson, 1883/1999) to the present day. The temporal shift and the 
separation of the narrating self and the younger, experiencing self 
immediately creates the heteroglossia and heteroscopia necessary for our 
engagement with the character. For a young reader, an adult voice, 
whether omniscient or retrospective, has authority. Dorrit Cohn (1978) 
calls this type of narration dissonant (pp. 145-153); in analogy, we can 
speak of cognitive dissonance. Any kind of narrative “anomaly,” that is, 
deviation from a straightforward, chronological, reliable narration, 
demands readers' attention and imagination to make sense. Even if the 
split between narrative agencies is minimal, the past narrative tense 
affords self-reflection from the fictitious “present” narrative position. The 
young readers’ theory of mind turns on, stimulated by the adult narrators’ 
theory of mind employed to re-create and assess their younger selves' 
thoughts and emotions. Both modes—blended impersonal and 
retrospective personal narration—presuppose disjunction between the 
narrating agency and the character. It is the intersection that shapes 
identity that young readers can engage with.  
Ostensibly, from a cognitive-psychological point of view, there is 
little difference between a literary character represented as Self or Other; 
cognitively, the character will always be Other, and readers will always 
have to relate to him or her as they relate to other people in real life. For a 
literary scholar, however, there is a significant difference between 
narratives that portray people from the outside and narratives that are self-
reflective and focused on identity. The reason YA writers use personal 
narration to an increasingly greater extent is possibly an attempt to create 
a more intimate—and therefore purportedly more authentic—voice. Yet 
there is a more profound reason. Personal narration involves the linguistic 
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function of deixis. Personal pronouns, such as “I,” “you,” and “he/she” 
are deictic shifters, signifiers that change their signified depending on 
circumstances. For cognitive criticism, the importance of deixis lies in its 
embodiment, its anchoring in spatio-temporal context. Deictic shifting is 
a powerful narrative device since it contributes to the ambiguity of fiction 
(e.g., Duchan, Bruder, & Hewitt, 1995), which, again, is beneficial for 




I have allowed myself this lengthy preamble to point out some key 
differences in applying the tool kit of cognitive criticism to fiction written 
and marketed for a young audience. In choosing Slated (Terry, 2012) to 
illustrate my argument, I singled it out from a number of recent YA 
novels with similar features, thus judging it to be representative of a 
trend. If YA novels were traditionally realistic, focused on social issues 
(e.g., Hilton & Nikolajeva, 2012), in the past decade we have witnessed 
the emergence of YA novels written in non-mimetic modes, such as 
fantasy, dystopia, science fiction, and magical realism. Xenotopia, or 
strange-worldliness, is a powerful defamiliarisation device. In a xenotopic 
setting, readers are vulnerable, because they cannot anticipate the rules of 
this fictional world, including laws of nature, social structures, or physical 
abilities of its inhabitants. Slated is a dystopia, a highly exploited genre in 
contemporary YA adult fiction (Bradford, McCallum, Mallan, & 
Stephens, 2008; Hintz, Basu, & Broad, 2012; see also Davis, 2014, in this 
issue). It is a gratifying mode for exploring interiority since it can place 
young protagonists in situations impossible or improbable in real life. All 
fiction does this, but there is a limitation on what would be plausible for a 
young person in straightforward realistic fiction. The obvious attraction of 
young adult dystopia is the exploration of the boundaries of a young 
person's body and mind, since the mode allows the blurring of human and 
technology, the natural and the artificial (see Graham, 2002). However, 
the central premise in Slated is only marginally dystopian, since the 
slating—that is, memory manipulation—described in the novel is not only 
technically possible today, but commonly practised, albeit not on a grand 
scale.  
 In the following discussion of Slated, I investigate the narrative 
strategies employed to evoke young readers' cognitive and emotional 
response. How is the defamiliarised interiority represented? How does the 
text encourage readers to engage with the protagonist? And on a more 
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concrete level, how does the simultaneous, present-tense first-person 
narration work in Slated? If it does, which is still to be explored. 
 The sixteen-year-old protagonist/narrator has been surgically 
stripped of her memory, her mind becoming a blank slate. She is given a 
new name, a new family, and a new identity. As far as Kyla knows, 
slating is a mild punishment for a crime; she is given another chance. The 
premise of the plot is that a slated person cannot get aggressive, because 
emotions trigger the computer implant in the brain that reduces the 
“levels” (apparently neurotransmitters, although the word is not used), 
which is potentially lethal. Slated persons must watch their levels and 
regulate their basic emotions: anger, fear, anxiety, distress, but also 
excessive joy. Social emotions are beyond their reach. The present tense 
of Kyla's account is thus not a trivial convention, but an ingenious 
narrative device to represent the character's consciousness. Kyla does live 
in the present. She has no long-term memory beyond the moment she 
woke up after her surgery. She is not dumbed down enough to believe 
that she was created ready-made; she knows that she used to be someone 
else. But she has no way of knowing anything about her past. It does not 
exist.  
Here the text offers the reader the first big cognitive-affective 
challenge. Few of us have experience of living without a memory, and 
those who have cannot tell the story. Cognitive psychology has described 
subjects with damaged long-term memory, but we do not normally 
empathise with brain-damaged patients in clinical reports. Yet as readers 
of fiction, we are expected to empathise with Kyla, connecting with her 
empty consciousness. The unfamiliar situation demands the reader's full 
attention. Switching on empathy and theory of mind, readers are invited 
to consider how it feels not to be able to have any feelings at all. Let us 
remember that theory of mind, or mind-reading, is the ability to 
understand other people's thoughts, beliefs, and intentions independently 
of one's own. Empathy is the ability to understand other people's 
emotions. Both are indispensable social skills. In Slated, readers have an 
advantage over the protagonist since they know what Kyla lacks. This is 
an exacting exercise, but rewarding in the long run. Kyla comes to her 
new home, which is a recurrent script in YA literature; thus, readers are 
expected to recognise it. What they do not recognise, however, is that 
unlike the endless orphans and temporary exiles of classic children's and 
YA novels, Kyla has nothing to compare it with, no memory of any old 
home, a previous family, familiar environment, missed classmates, or 
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abandoned pets. The dislocation script is disrupted, and the readers need 
to adjust to an unknown and unknowable social and narrative situation.  
The theme of suppressed traumatic memory is frequent in YA 
literature, most often connected with the death of a close relative or 
friend. However, when it appears in a realist fiction we can relate to the 
characters' emotions even when we have no direct experience of them. 
Projecting our lived or mediated knowledge onto the text, we may 
recollect that bereavement causes, in this order, denial, anger, and grief. 
Yet we do not know how it feels not to be able to feel grief. Kyla's plight 
is not focused on her loss, since she does not know much about it. 
Without memory, she cannot predict any future for herself, either, nor 
make decisions. She is this strange, impossible singularity that does not 
have a trajectory. Her identity is blank, because identity, who we are, is 
built through memory. Here the first-person perspective becomes 
interesting: again, not merely a convention, but a justified narrative form. 
Although Kyla is seemingly totally disempowered, she is given a voice, 
and thus agency. 
Confronted with the literal single-mindedness of the protagonist, 
readers need to activate their theory of mind to get to grips with Kyla's 
experience. But how can it be possible, if her emotion discourse cannot 
utilise the familiar words and metaphors, and if what Kyla really feels has 
no adequate correspondence in our language? This is a dilemma 
frequently discussed in respect to representation of emotions in fiction: 
emotions are, unlike language, non-linear, imprecise, unstructured, and 
diffuse. Therefore language is an inadequate medium to represent 
emotions, and “telling,” that is, putting a simple label on an emotional 
state, is less engaging than “showing” by a wide register of narrative 
means available to fiction. How, then, can “showing,” representation 
rather than metarepresentation (Zunshine, 2006), allow readers to 
circumvent the extremely unreliable narration by someone who not only 
lacks life experience, but any knowledge and understanding of selfhood?  
Cognitive psychology highlights the embodiment of emotions 
(Gallagher, 2005; Johnson, 1990; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), which in our 
engagement with fiction is both afforded by texts and available to readers. 
This observation is particularly pertinent to children's and YA literature. 
While adults are expected to master their emotions, children express them 
without inhibition. Happy children, in real life as well as in fiction, run, 
jump, hop, skip, dance, poke each other, climb trees. Angry children 
throw tantrums. Scared children cover their faces and crouch together. 
Children's fiction utilises this device to create ambiguity between what 
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the narrator states explicitly and what the reader can infer from the 
character's behaviour (Nikolajeva, 2013). From the beginning, Kyla's 
experience of her new home is visual, tactile, gustatory, and olfactory. 
She may not be able to label her emotions, but she is obviously fully 
capable of experiencing them (which seems to be an accurate description 
of subjects with damaged brains). She shies away from her foster mother's 
hugs, but enjoys stroking a cat. When Kyla's “levels” drop because of 
anxiety, she survives by running. Running to the verge of exhaustion is 
her way of communicating her happiness to other people as well as the 
reader. Thus the text successfully utilizes representation of bodily 




There is another, less conventional way of embodiment of 
emotions in the novel, possible because of the non-mimetic mode. Since 
Slateds are subjected to governmental surveillance, they are equipped 
with a monitor connected to the chip in their brains that controls the level 
of their emotions. Not only Slateds themselves, but anyone, can read their 
monitors. (This, again, is not simply a detail of a technologically 
advanced future; think, for instance, of electronic tagging for paroled 
prisoners or remote control of diabetic patients). Kyla is therefore in a 
disadvantaged position, since everyone can read her emotions, but she 
cannot read other people's. Externalisation of emotional states is an 
intriguing device in fiction, most brilliantly explored in Philip Pullman's 
fantasy trilogy, His Dark Materials (1995, 1997, 2000), where people's 
minds are projected outside their bodies in the form of daemons. The 
inhabitants of Pullman's fictional world do not need theory of mind since 
their minds are visible and express their emotions for them. However, 
Lyra, the main character, as any character in a Bildungsroman, needs to 
acquire the necessary social skills, including empathy. Thus is exactly 
what Lyra learns throughout the trilogy, but to master it, she needs to let 
go of her daemon, which translates into internalisation of her mental and 
emotional life. Readers, who initially received direct information about 
Lyra's emotions through the shape and behaviour of her daemon, must 
subsequently return to mind-reading and, for instance, recognise Lyra's 
guilt as the engine behind her decision-making (Nikolajeva, 2012a). 
Kyla's ultimate goal in Slated is also to get rid of her external 
emotion indicator (which she achieves in the sequel). Yet before she is 
ready to even imagine such a possibility, she needs to develop theory of 
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mind, and the readers need to apply higher-order mind-reading, of the 
type “A thinks that B thinks that C thinks ....” Apparently, an average 
reader is able to automatically keep track of three to four orders, while 
any additional order demands a special effort (e.g., Vermeule, 2010, p. 
37). It would make an interesting empirical study, but my guess is that 
average young readers do not automatically go beyond the second order 
(in this case, what Kyla thinks), while the text encourages, if not compels 
us, to venture deeper, into “Kyla thinks that her mother thinks” and 
further still: “Kyla thinks that her mother thinks that Kyla thinks....” 
Cognitive critics, such as Zunshine (2006, 2012) and Vermeule (2010), 
do not claim it explicitly, but it follows from their argument that the 
quality of a literary text can be evaluated through the depth of embedded 
mind-reading it potentially affords. In any case, as I argue throughout this 
article, we engage more strongly with fiction that offers challenge and 
resistance.  
With her brain slated, Kyla lacks empathy, and her theory of mind 
has regressed to that of a very young child. The visiting nurse warns 
Kyla's foster mother about Kyla being “like a small child,” but she is only 
referring to Kyla's lack of practical knowledge: for instance, she does not 
know that a knife is sharp and can hurt you. However, such everyday 
skills are relatively easy to learn. Kyla's real dilemma is the social 
knowledge. She can judge people by their actions, but does not 
understand what they think and thus is unable to grasp the motivation of 
these actions or to predict any future actions.  
In real life, we have no access to other people's minds and need to 
be able to read their emotions from external signals, notably facial 
expressions and body language. A famous example from The Curious 
Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time, by Mike Haddon (2003), shows 
how an autistic boy learns to understand people's basic emotions with the 
help of emoticons: once he has connected his own concrete and singular 
experience with the emoticons of “happy” and “sad,” he is able to read 
other people's facial expressions as reflecting their emotions of happiness 
or distress (Kümmerling-Meibauer, 2012). Kyla, in Slated, is not autistic, 
but her brain damage does not allow her to read other people's faces. 
Neither can she control her own face, which is a clear disadvantage, since 
everybody around her can easily understand her state of mind. As her 
emotional skills develop, Kyla must learn how to wear a “poker face.”  
Because Kyla cannot read external emotional signs, she is 
dependent on what people say and what they do. She is thus completely 
deceived by her foster mother's actions and frosty attitudes, by her 
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therapist's routine phrases, by her teachers' hostility, and by her school 
counsellor's amiability. Here readers are expected to employ their theory 
of mind to grasp Kyla's shortcomings as a mind-reader. After all, readers 
have privileged knowledge over Kyla. Even the least adept child has more 
expertise than Kyla in mind-reading. However, the specific text/reader 
relationship of children's and young adult fiction creates a worry. Expert 
readers will typically be able to detach themselves from the protagonist's 
subject position, irrespective of the narrative form (personal or 
impersonal focalised), as they do with Maisie (James, 1897/1998) or, for 
instance, Scout in To Kill a Mockingbird (Lee, 1960/2010). Such 
detachment is deliberately created in fiction through narrative slant, that 
is, shifting the subject position away from the reader. Making the 
protagonist a child or a mentally disabled person effectively interferes 
with the adult, mentally healthy reader's sharing the protagonist's 
subjectivity. In other words, as repeatedly pointed out in studies of 
empathy in fiction, a reader must be able to get empathically engaged 
with a character without sharing his or her literal or transferred point of 
view; to be curious about a character who is unpleasant, ugly, sick, 
criminal, mentally retarded, morally depraved or even inhuman. Unless 
we can do this, we will not be able to engage with Macbeth (Shakespeare, 
1623/1990), Raskolnikov (Dostoyevsky, 1866/2002), or Gregor Samsa 
(Kafka, 1915/2007). 
The problem with young readers is their solipsism. They will most 
probably automatically identify with the protagonist, not least a present-
tense first-person narrator/protagonist, unless prompted by the text to 
avoid it. However, such direct or immersive identification, when readers 
simply align with the character's thoughts and actions as if they were their 
own—the “just-like-me” assessment of characters—is limited to the 
readers' scope of experience and does not endorse mind-reading. For 
engagement with fiction, it is counter-productive. In real life, theory of 
mind is essential for interpersonal communication. Direct identification 
precludes or at least substantially impedes mind-reading, since readers 
know, or rather believe they know, exactly what the character thinks and 
feels by projecting their own real-life experience onto the character. This 
is a solipsistic position that educators in real life encourage young people 
to abandon. Readers' narrative goals, and thus desired outcomes, do not 
necessarily coincide with the character's. In other words, a character can 
obtain his or her goal and therefore experience happiness, while a reader's 
goal, and thus preferred outcome, evokes sorrow or disgust (as adult, 
professional readers, we may find the endings of most children's novels 
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unsatisfactory). Readers who identify with characters may uncritically 
share the character's goals, and thus emotions. 
YA authors have a range of narrative devices to subvert 
immersive identification, or “identification fallacy” (Nikolajeva, 2011), 
without toppling over to Jamesian irony. Non-mimetic modes and 
settings, non-human characters, fluid gender identities, ambiguous 
narrative situations, and multiple narration effectively steer the readers' 
subjectivity away from the protagonist, which immediately demands 
attention and advanced mind-reading. Paradoxical as it may seem, 
personal narration can produce the same effect, as long as the narrator is 
sufficiently othered, which Kyla doubtless is. Therefore, personal 
narration in Slated does not endorse immersive identification, but on the 
contrary, encourages employing theory of mind because the 
protagonist/narrator is alienated by her brain damage.  
Yet the text goes even further in its cognitive twist. If readers have 
an advantage over Kyla in understanding non-slated people's emotions, 
the advantage Kyla has over non-slated people, as well as the readers, is 
that she understands other Slateds' emotions. Slateds are programmed to 
be incessantly happy, which is naturally difficult for readers to 
understand, since even if generally happy, we constantly experience 
shades of other emotions. It is almost impossible to imagine that a 
deviation from happiness can cause excruciating pain, blackout, and 
death. Here, the readers are expected to use a different higher-order mind-
reading than when Kyla tries to understand her parents and teachers. 
Readers know how ordinary people think, even though young readers 
may have problems with contradictory emotions. Still, readers should be 
able to see that Kyla misunderstands ordinary people's minds. 
Conversely, readers do not know how Slateds think, while Kyla does. She 
knows that her foster sister is vacuously happy because her brain implant 
makes her feel happy, that her classmate is scared and her boyfriend is 
anxious. Moreover, Kyla knows that other Slateds know what she is 
feeling (fourth order of mind-reading). This intricate tension between 
what Kyla knows and what readers know, between what Kyla knows and 
what secondary characters know, and between what readers know and 
what secondary characters know, prompts readers to be on the alert if 
they want to be ahead of the protagonist in solving the mystery. In other 
words, engaging with the text demands perception, attention, imagination, 
empathy, and reasoning, all important components of cognitive activity.  
Mystery, with all its genre variations (crime novel, thriller, horror, 
paranormal romance), is a perfect field for mind-reading in fiction (see 
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Part III of Zunshine, 2006). Mystery is based on narrative paralipsis, the 
omission of essential information that is either hidden from the character, 
or the reader, or both. Reading a mystery demands putting together puzzle 
bits acquired from various sources and filling in with inferences from 
concealed minds. As in any skilful mystery, in Slated, readers are given 
clues ahead of the protagonist. For someone with a minimal knowledge of 
neuroscience, the signal appears long before the consequence is 
explicated. Kyla is left-handed. Or rather, she discovers to her amazement 
that she is left-handed and that her left hand seems to “remember” things 
that her consciousness has been forced to forget. Her left hand can draw 
images of which she has no conscious recollection. Once again, the 
emotional memory turns out to be embodied. Readers may not know 
about laterality, but the left-handedness is described in a way that makes 
them curious and alert. In recursive engagement with the text, they will 
look back for details to fill the narrative gaps.  
Here, the incoherent italicised passages in the novel start to make 
sense, since they offer an alternative perspective on the events. I still do 
not feel that italicising is fully justified. Apart from explicit temporal 
indications, temporal shifts in fiction can be marked by tense, possibly 
amplified by iterative frequency. Memory narrative within a past-tense 
narration may be marked by present tense, and vice versa. Since Slated is 
told in the present tense, and memory narrative is rendered in the present 
tense as well, perhaps italics have a function after all, although for a 
reader familiar with the conventions of fiction it still should not be a 
problem to discern memory narrative from the main story. The memory 
passages are incomplete, fragmented, and to begin with, inscrutable, 
which should be sufficient to perceive them as deviant from Kyla's 
conscious narration. Yet together with Kyla's left-hand motor memory, 
they firmly indicate that there is a lived experience stored in Kyla's brain, 
suppressed, but not totally severed. At some point Kyla discovers that 
broccoli is disgusting. She does not even know what broccoli is, and she 
has never seen it before, yet the taste triggers a vague, but clearly 
embodied and emotionally charged memory. Kyla also discovers that she 
has a motor memory of driving. Eventually, it transpires that the minimal 
past Kyla was supplied with at the hospital is a fabrication. Somewhere, 
she has a loving family who miss her. Yet she also used to belong to a 
gang of terrorists, who are now trying to claim her back. Here the reader 
is invited to consider what is going on in a split mind. Kyla has just 
started to accept her new life, to understand and even like her new 
mother, to be curious about her classmates, to enjoy having a friend. 
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Suddenly, she is confronted with at least two different identities, two 
additional names. She is given two contradictory sets of the past that she 
has been deprived of.  
 
Emotions and Ethics 
 
Adolescent identity is inevitably unstable, so the text merely 
offers a metaphor for what neuroscience describes in terms of chemical 
and electric cerebral processes. Yet Kyla's dilemma is more complex than 
an average real-life adolescent's. With her multiple pasts, she can make an 
active choice and decide which of them has construed her true identity. 
Yet is any identity more real than any other one? Can she shed her 
experience after she has been slated, obliterate the memory of her new 
life? Now these different sets of memories are mixed up, interwoven, and 
inseparable; they have fused into yet another identity, as reflected in the 
title of the sequel: Fractured (Terry, 2013).  
 A decisive step in Kyla's identity formation is the emergence of 
social, or higher-cognitive emotions: love, hatred, jealousy, and guilt. 
Unlike basic emotions, social emotions are not innate and have to be 
learned and trained. They always involve more than one individual (e.g.,  
Oatley, 1992). Love, for instance, implies that two individuals' ultimate 
goals and happiness are equally valuable for both. Moreover, it requires 
that both are prepared to negotiate and even sacrifice their own happiness 
for the happiness of the other party (see the discussion of love in Hogan, 
2011, 76-110). Slateds are not supposed to be able to love, since it 
jeopardises their selfish happiness. Again, for most readers, it is probably 
an unfamiliar state of mind, inviting strong empathy, that is, an attempt to 
understand how it feels not to be able to experience love. Mutual love, 
viewed pragmatically as a social bond ensuring procreation and 
protection of the progeny, is the foremost source of happiness, which 
accounts for the abundance of happy endings in certain literary genres, 
including YA literature. The premise of Slated, however, precludes a 
happy ending, since Kyla's and her boyfriend Ben's feelings toward each 
other raise their level of anxiety and are potentially fatal. Their need to 
protect each other, natural between lovers, triggers aggression toward any 
external threat. Since both are slated, they understand each other's mind 
and feelings perfectly, yet their damaged brains do not allow them a full 
expression of feelings. Ben's blackout as he tries to destroy his monitor 
brings about a storm of emotions in Kyla, including grief and guilt. 
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However, by that time she has become someone different from the 
complacent teenager we met at the beginning of the novel. 
Kyla's emotional maturation thus leads to a whole range of ethical 
issues where readers need to liberate themselves from any remnants of 
immersive identification. Cognitive critics, in particular Hogan (2003b, 
2011), Keen (2007), and Vermeule (2010), explicitly connect ethics and 
social justice with emotions and empathy. Ethical values are an essential 
part of any consciousness and thus govern people's behaviour and 
relationships with other people, as well as with the physical and social 
environment. Understanding other people's ethical beliefs is therefore a 
vital constituent in theory of mind and empathy, and arguably a more 
sophisticated constituent. Indeed, we may understand how other people 
think and how this thinking motivates their actions, but we may need to 
go beyond the basic motives to comprehend that people can act not only 
against common sense, but against their own good, because of their 
ethical convictions. Ethical values are closely interconnected with 
emotions, and the conflict between ethics and emotions is central for 
human existence, in real life and in fiction. Fiction offers perfect 
opportunities to contemplate this conflict. The system of ethical values 
and beliefs is also an inseparable part of our identity, and identity 
formation includes the understanding of ethics and the development of 
ethical principles that will regulate our behaviour throughout our lives. 
Fiction offers representation of this identity formation, providing 
vicarious ethical experience not easily available in real life. In other 
words, fiction puts its characters in situations where ethical issues are 
inescapable, and moreover, in fiction these issues can be amplified and 
become more tangible, as clearly seen in Slated.  
 One of the major theorists of ethical criticism, Martha Nussbaum 
(1990, 1995, 2001), claims more or less explicitly that we become better 
individuals and citizens because of reading. While I would not go that far, 
we are undeniably affected by interaction with literature (see Booth, 
1988; Guroian, 2002; Marshall, 2009), which is particularly pertinent for 
my argument, since in YA fiction emotions are frequently pitched against 
ethical values. Empathical versus immersive identification is decisive for 
the reader's position: “adopting another person's point of view is a 
dangerous thing.... It creates feelings and attachments. It leads us to think 
of this other person in moral terms” (Hogan, 2003b, pp. 139-140). The 
danger with Slated is that readers can be seduced to take Kyla's side, 
rather than consider an independent ethical position. 
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 Whatever Kyla's identity is, she is legally and morally guilty of 
assisting Ben in what might have led to his death and what leads to his re-
slating. Moreover, she feels guilty about the disappearance of her 
classmates and teachers who are either slated or “terminated” by the 
totalitarian government. However, the only alternative to the government 
is terrorism, and in one of Kyla's restored identities, explored in 
Fractured, she is exploited by a terrorist organisation to be used as a 
suicide bomber. Kyla's fractured mind is divided between hatred toward 
the regime, loyalty toward the terrorists, but also hatred toward terrorism 
and frustration over what she believes is her biological parents' betrayal. 
The italicised fragments, repeated with increasing clarity, begin to gather 
into a more cohesive story. Kyla is now a vessel of strong and 
contradictory emotions that, fortunately, few young readers have been 
exposed to. The gradual regaining of several sets of memories, none of 
which is more reliable than the other, and thus the painstaking reiteration 
of identity formation, is a powerful portrayal of an adolescent's identity 
crisis. Kyla's extreme situation offers readers an exceptional opportunity 
to engage with her dilemma and to test empathy vicariously, in a safe 
mode.  
 
The young adult novel emerged in the late 1960s-early 1970s as a 
hyperrealistic form, focused on everyday problems and issues that 
adolescents struggle with, including sexuality, drugs, violence, parental 
revolt, and social pressure. Most of the young adult novels published 
today still follow this path, yet the lure of the “what if” allowed in non-
mimetic modes is quite apparent in YA novels today. I do not think that 
the emergence of this trend is a coincidence; I believe it is informed by 
achievements in neuroscience. We know tremendously much more about 
how our brains work than we did only ten years ago. We know how 
memory works, and we know that empathy is an indispensable social 
skill, evolutionarily conditioned. This knowledge is hugely tempting for 
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